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Abstract—This paper presents a new economic approach for
studying competition and innovation in a complex and highly
interactive system of network providers, users, and suppliers of
digital goods and services (i.e., service providers). It employs
Cournot and Bertrand games to model competition among service
providers and network providers, respectively, and develops a
novel unified model to capture the interaction and competition
among these players in a “service-oriented” Internet. Incentives
for service and network innovation are studied in this model.

I. I NTRODUCTION
As the Internet evolves and diffuses through society, economic factors are often more important than technological
ones in determining what services are offered, and how they
are priced. But the economics of the Internet is far more
mysterious than the underlying technology. That is true even
at the level of network providers, where the basic connectivity
is fairly well known, but the business relationships that give
rise to observed connections, and the incentives that led to
them, are mostly hidden from view. When we come to services
offered over the Internet, the complexity increases, and our
knowledge drops even further. And the literature in this area
is still limited, in spite of the extensive interest that exists.
In this paper, we consider the Internet as a service delivery
platform (i.e., we disregard its other roles, such as in providing
connectivity among users, etc.), and study the relationships
among the entities that provide transport (network providers, in
our language), those that provide services (service providers),
and users. We assume a certain industry structure (with network providers completely separate from service providers),
and several rules imposed by regulators (such as some nondiscrimination conditions, and possibly even some price regulation), and some other common market features (such as
basic network connectivity being provided to users on a flat
rate basis). This constrains the problem enough to provide
opportunity to build models that are tractable and yet reflect
what is observed in the marketplace, and are rich enough to
show interesting dynamics.
We propose a simple economic model of the interactions
and competition among service providers, network providers
and users. Using this model, we explore how competition
affects the network and service providers, and in particular
how to maximize the incentives for innovation on the part
This work is supported in part by the US National Science Foundation
grants CNS-0721510 and CNS-0721610.

of network providers and service providers. Our main tools
come from the standard economic literature on Bertrand and
Cournot competition (see Section II for a brief overview of
these concepts). While both types of competition are well
known in economics, one of the key novelties and contributions
of our paper is combining these two different types of games
in a single unified framework to capture the co-dependence
or interaction between service and network providers. With
our assumptions, we model the competition between service
providers using Cournot games, and the competition between
network providers using Bertrand games.
The two types of competition (or games) are tied together
in a two-stage Stackelberg game where service providers
determine the optimal (equilibrium) amount of services each
produces/offers to meet user demands, and network providers
determine what optimal (equilibrium) prices to charge service
providers for transporting the accompanying services. We are
able to explicitly solve this unified Cournot-Bertrand model,
and thereby study the effects of competition between service
providers and competition between network providers on the
overall equilibrium market demand/supply and prices. Furthermore, it enables us to investigate and quantify incentives for
service and network providers to innovate and further spur the
market demand for services.
Because of its simplifying assumptions, our economic
model clearly does not capture the intricate and complex
relationships and industry structures that exist in the real
Internet, and represents only a modest attempt in analyzing and
understanding these relationships in a formal economic setting.
Nonetheless, our work provides a useful and tractable model
to generate some qualitative insights into these relationships.
To our best knowledge, our paper is perhaps the first attempt
to explicitly model the interaction, competition and innovation
among service providers, network providers and users in a
“service-oriented” Internet. As more services–not only content
(news, music, videos, etc.), but also software, computing and
storage resources (as in cloud computing)–are being offered
online, we believe that understanding the economic factors
that affect the interacting, co-dependent and yet competing
relationships among various players in this service-oriented
Internet is of critical importance. As the research community
contemplates “clean-slate” designs for future Internet architectures, models for assessing the economic viability of new
network architectures are especially needed. We hope our work
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can inspire more studies to follow.
Related Work. Network economics has been a very active
area of research. While there are many papers on network
pricing and other economic issues of networks (see, e.g., the
proceedings of NetEcon workshops or Review of Network
Economics journal), relatively few studies have focused on
economic aspects of network architectures. Examples of the
latter include recent studies of network neutrality (see, e.g.,
[1]–[3]), evaluating network architectures via the theory of real
options [4], and modeling technology adoption dynamics [5].
II. P ROBLEM S ETTING
A. Problem Setting and Basic Assumptions
We consider the Internet as a service delivery platform,
and assume three separate types of entities: service providers,
network providers and users. Fig. 1 schematically depicts the
relations among the three entities. Clearly, users are the key
drivers in the relations among the three. Users pay a fixed
monthly fee to their network providers for basic connectivity,
which enables them to access various application services.
While users pay for basic connectivity through a flat rate,
we assume that access to services such as music or video,
or cloud computing, is not free (and so, in particular, is not
paid for through advertising). Instead, users pay for those
services to the service providers. The payment might be per
unit of service, e.g., $0.99 per song, or might be on a monthly
subscription basis for a newspaper or music site. But in some
rough sense users’ fees to service providers are proportional
to those users’ volumes of consumption of those services.
Service providers derive their revenues from user fees, and
have to pay for the costs of creating their offerings, as well
as for their transport to the users. Network providers derive
their revenues from the flat monthly fees of their users and the
usage-sensitive transport charges from service providers (see
eq. (4)), but have to pay for their infrastructure.
users

provide
services

provide
transport
pay for
pay for
services network access

service
providers

pay for
transport

network
providers

provide
transport

Fig. 1.

Relations between network providers, service providers and users.

In our model we assume that there are only two service
providers who offer the same type of services (in the economic
parlance, they are substitutable goods) and compete between
themselves for user accesses. There are also only two network
providers, each connecting their respective users to the two
service providers and competing between themselves for transporting services to users. For simplicity, we assume that each
user stays with the same network provider throughout (e.g.,
due to geographical locations and local incumbent monopoly).

Fig. 2 depicts the flow of commodities (namely, services and
the associated traffic) and prices. As in the current Internet,
the action of any one of the actors, say in improving the
transmission infrastructure, or in changing a price, affects all
other actors, and leads to interesting dynamics.
B. A Quick Economic Primer and Model Justification
In economics, demand (function/curve) is defined as a
function between the price of a commodity (services in our
model) and the quantity of the commodity (the amount of
service in our model) that consumers/users are willing and
able to purchase at the given price [6]. Likewise, supply
(function/curve) is defined as a function between the price of
a commodity and the quantity of the commodity that a firm
(a service provider in our case) is able to produce at the given
price. Demand curves are used in economic models to estimate
behaviors in competitive markets. At the equilibrium price,
demand and supply are equal, and the equilibrium quantity
(the amount of service) will be produced and consumed at the
equilibrium price.
We use two different types of standard economic games in
our model: Cournot competition between service providers,
and Bertrand competition between network providers. In economics [7], Cournot competition/game is a model of competition in which firms (service providers in our case) compete on
quantity (i.e., the volume of services) they produce–which they
decide independently and at the same time– based on their cost
of production, represented by the marginal cost, or the cost for
producing one additional unit of service. In a Cournot game,
the market price is set at a level such that demand equals the
total quantity produced by all firms. In other words, the service
price is determined by the supply and demand for services in
the market. In contrast, in a Bertrand competition/game firms
(network providers in our case) compete on price–with each
one choosing its price independently and at the same time–and
supply the quantities demanded at those prices.
In our model we use a Cournot game to characterize the
competition between two service providers, as we assume they
produce substitutable services (e.g., music or video downloads), and the price of these services is essentially determined
by competition and market supply and demand. In other words,
due to competition, different service providers have limited
ability to choose their own prices, and in equilibrium, they
converge to the same price and consequently determine the
equilibrium amount of services each produces or offers. On
the other hand, we use the Bertrand game to characterize the
competition between two network providers, as they do not
directly produce services, but instead transport the full amount
of services produced by service providers to their respective
users. They can indirectly influence the amount of services
produced by service providers, thus the amount (of traffic)
they have to transport, by varying the prices they charge them.
Hence, network providers compete on the network transport
prices/fees they charge the service providers to influence or
attract the amount of services they transport.
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SP1 (S1)
transport
price r1
service
price q

transport
price r1

transport
price r2

transport
price r2

NP1 (N1)

“user demand sensitivity” to p. The parameters γij (≥ 0), i, j =
1, 2, capture the combined “abilities” of service provider S j
and network provider Ni to offer and transport services to
meet the user demand. The role of γij ’s can be intuitively
understood as follows: γij = −∂xji /∂q, so that γij represents
the proportional “market share” of an increase in user demand
that service provider S j and network provider Ni can jointly
capture by increasing the service supply (by ∂xji amount) to
user Ui of network provider Ni when the service price q drops
by ∂q. Hence the larger γij is, the better S j (and Ni )’s ability
to increase its supply and gain market share.
The two service providers engage in a Cournot competition.
Given a service price q as in eq. (1), S 1 and S 2 compete to
determine the “optimal” amount of services, xji , i = 1, 2, to
offer users of both networks so as to maximize their respective
profits. Let sj denote the marginal cost of S j (for producing
one unit of service). The profit generated by S j for supplying
an amount xji of services to user Ui is given by

SP1 (S2)

service
price q

net access
price p

NP2 (N2)

service
price q

net access
price p

User 1
(U1)

User 2
(U2)
services/traffic between SPs and
users transported by NPs
various prices paid by
users/SPs to SPs/NPs

Fig. 2.

Model illustration: flows of prices and services/traffic.

III. F ORMAL M ODEL AND ITS S OLUTION
A. The Model

j

j
j
ΠS
i := (q − ri − s )xi ,

As depicted in Fig. 2, there are two network providers1 ,
denoted by Ni , i = 1, 2, and two service providers, S j ,
j = 1, 2. The user (base), Ui , of network provider Ni is
assumed fixed. Each user Ui , i = 1, 2, pays a price of p (e.g.,
a monthly network access charge) to access the network, and
buys services from either one of the two service providers,
paying a price of q per unit of service. Network provider Ni
charges service provider S j a price of ri to transport one unit
of service (or rather the associated traffic) between S j and
Ui . Note that while the transport prices r1 and r2 charged by
the network providers may be different, they do not charge
different prices to different service providers. (Hence a form
of network neutrality is assumed in our model.) Note also
that in our model both q and ri represent usage-sensitive (i.e.,
“volume-based”) pricing, while p is a flat-rate price.
The overall user demand for services is a function of both
the network access charge p and the service price q. Hence
when p or q increases, user demands for services decrease.
Let xji , i, j = 1, 2, denote the amount of service produced by
service provider S j and consumed by user Ui . The relation
between the service price q, the network access charge p and
the service quantities (“supplies”), xji , is assumed to be given
by the following (inverse) demand function:
q = 1 − βp −

2 
2

1
j=1 i=1

γij

xji .

(1)

We first note that eq. (1) implicitly assumes that the service
price is normalized to be within the range [0,1]; hence service
quantities and other parameters are appropriately normalized.
The parameter β(≥ 0) in eq. (1) captures the effect of the
network access charge p on the overall user demand, viz., the
1 Throughout

this paper we use the convention that subscripts denote
network providers, whereas superscripts denote service providers. For conciseness, we will also use the singular term “user” to collectively refer to all
users (the user base) of one network provider, and treat the collection of them
as if they were a single user.

(2)

where ri is the transport price that Ni charges for transporting
the traffic associated with one unit of service. Let X j := xj1 +
xj2 denote the total amount of service produced by S j . The
total profit of S j is then given by
j

j

j

S
j
j
j
j
ΠS := ΠS
1 + Π2 = (q − r1 )x1 + (q − r2 )x2 − s X .

(3)

In contrast, network providers engage in a Bertrand competition. For i = 1, 2, define Yi := x1i + x2i , the total amount of
services produced by S 1 and S 2 and consumed by user Ui of
Ni . Thus Yi is the amount of services (or the accompanying
traffic) that network provider Ni must transport between its
user and the service providers. Network provider Ni does not
“produce” Yi ; it only indirectly controls it by adjusting the
price ri it charges the two service providers. Let ni denote
the marginal cost of Ni (for transporting the traffic associated
with one unit of service). The total profit of Ni is thus
ΠNi := (ri − ni )Yi + p, i = 1, 2,

(4)

where the first term in the right hand side represents the net
profit for transporting service traffic, and the second term is
the price paid by the user for network access. In a Bertrand
game, the two network providers, Ni , i = 1, 2, compete by
determining the “optimal” price ri each charges the service
providers to maximize their respective profit.
Combining the Cournot competition between service
providers, and the Bertrand competition between network
providers, produces a Stackelberg game consisting of a
Cournot (sub-)game and a Bertrand (sub-)game. The parameters and variables used in the model are summarized in Table I.
In the next subsection, we show how the model can be solved.
B. Solving the Model
We solve the model using a two-stage procedure. In the
first stage, given the network transport prices ri ’s, the service
providers S 1 and S 2 compete in a Cournot game. The Nash
equilibrium state of the Cournot game yields the “optimal”
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TABLE I
S UMMARY OF M ODEL PARAMETERS AND VARIABLES

Parameters

Quantities

Prices

List of Parameters
β
user demand sensitivity to p
γij
(joint) “market share” of S j & Ni
γ j = γ1j + γ2j
total “market share” of S j
γi = γi1 + γi2
total “market share” of Ni
List of Variables
xji
service of S j consumed by Ui
j
j
j
X = x1 + x2 total service produced by S j
Yi = x1i + x2i
total service transported by Ni
q
user service price
ri
network transport price (by Ni )
p
user network access charge

carries (roughly) a fraction γi /γ of the total traffic generated
by the service market, with a market share of (roughly) γi .
Effect of Network Access Price p and Its Optimal Choice.
In our model, we assume that the price p is determined by a
policy maker with the objective of maximizing social welfare.
Using Theorem 1, we now determine the optimal price p∗
that maximizes the total social welfare. Following standard
economic principles, we define the social welfare function,
denoted by ΠSW , as follows:
SW

Π

U

(p) := Π (p) +

2

i=1

equilibrium service quantities, xji , i, j = 1, 2, and service
price q, all as functions of p, ri ’s. In the second stage,
the network providers N1 and N2 compete in a Bertrand
game to determine the network transport prices, ri ’s, so as
to maximize their respective profit. Substituting ri ’s into the
(optimal) xji ’s obtained in the Cournot game, we obtain the
final optimal equilibrium service quantities, xji ’s, in terms of
p (and the model parameters). Using this two-stage procedure,
the solution to the Stackelberg game with two-stage CournotBertrand sub-games is stated in the following theorem. A more
detailed derivation of this theorem can be found in [8], where
numerical examples are also provided to illustrate the results.
Theorem 1 (Solution of the Model): For a fixed network
access charge p, the competitions between service providers
and network providers, modeled as a Stackelberg game with
two-stage Cournot-Bertrand sub-games, yield the equilibrium
˜
state {xji , i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2}, q̃, r̃1 , r̃2 , where
γij 3
3 1
7
2
5 [ 8 (1 − βp) − 4 (s + s ) − 16 (n1 + n2 )
2
1 γ1
γij
γ21
γ22
7s2 γ1
j
1
+ 7s
16 ( γ1 + γ2 ) + 16 ( γ1 + γ2 )] + 5 (w−i − s ),

x̃ji =

(5)

1
1
2
here w−i := 14 [n−i − γ−i
(s1 γ−i
+ s2 γ−i
)], and for a given
player i, the notation −i indicates the other player (network
provider); furthermore,

r̃i

= 18 (1 − βp) − 14 (si + sj ) +
i

s
(
− 16

3γi1
γi

−

1
γ−i

γ−i )

−

1
16 (3ni − n−i )
2
2
γ−i
sj 3γi
16 ( γi − γ−i ).

(6)

and
q̃

=

3
10 (1

− βp) + 15 (s1 + s2 ) +

1
s γ1
− 20
( γ1
1

+

γ21
γ2 )

−

2
s γ1
20 ( γ1
2

1
20 (n1 +
γ2
+ γ22 ).

n2 )
(7)

As a result of the Cournot/Bertrand competitions between
service/network providers, the amount of service, x̃ji ’s,
offered at equilibrium by S j to user Ui of network provider
γj
Ni is (roughly) in the proportion γi of the total market. Thus
the “market share” of service provider S j in network Ni is
(roughly) γij , and its total “market share” in both networks
is (roughly) γ j := γ1j + γ2j . Similarly, network provider Ni

Ni

Π

(p) +

2


j

ΠS (p),

(8)

j=1

where ΠU (p) is the consumer (i.e., user) surplus when the
network access
 j price is p. Since the total market demand,
X̃(p) :=
x̃i , as a function of p is given by eq. (5), the
consumer surplus is therefore given by
 pmax
ΠU :=

X̃(p) =

p

1
(pmax − p) · X̃(p).
2

(9)

The social welfare is a convex function. In particular, its
maximum is attained when either p = 0 or p = pmax .
When p = pmax , there is no user demand for services. The
network providers only profit from network access charges
paid by the users. This scenario obviously only makes sense
if there is intrinsic value in the network besides the services
offered by the service providers. Otherwise, users would have
no incentive to use the network and pay a network access
charge; the network provider would then lose users and thus
receive zero profit in the end. On the other hand, when p = 0,
the market demand is maximized, and therefore the consumer
surplus is also maximized. Further, both the profits of the
service providers and the network providers are non-zero.
IV. I NCENTIVES FOR I NNOVATIONS
In this section, we consider the following questions: i) under
what conditions would either a service provider or network
provider have incentives for service innovation or network
upgrade; and ii) how do the interactions and competition
among them affect such incentives? To separate the effects
of innovation by service and network providers, here we refer
to innovation by a service provider as service innovation, and
that by a network provider as network upgrade.
We define service innovation as an investment by a service
provider which will result in an increase in the quality of
the supply or a decrease in the market (service) price, thereby
expanding its share of the user demand for services. Likewise,
we define network upgrade as an investment by a network
provider which will result in an increase in the quality and/or
capability of the network infrastructure or a decrease in the
market (transport) price, thereby expanding its share of the
market demand for service/traffic transport. In both cases, any
innovation or upgrade will increase the overall market demand.

5

A. Incentives for Service Innovation
We indirectly model the investment made by a service
provider for service innovation by accounting for its effect
in our model. Consider service provider S j . Innovation by S j
would lead to an increase in the overall market demand for
services, and therefore result in a decrease in the service price
q. From the inverse demand function of eq. (1), ∂xji /(−∂q) =
γij , and ∂X j /(−∂q) = ∂xj1 /(−∂q)+∂xj2 /(−∂q) = γ1j +γ2j =
γ j . We assume that innovation by S j would increase its
competitiveness, and thus its corresponding “market share”
of the overall user demand. Hence we model the effect of
innovation by S j by a positive increase in γ j , and assume
that service innovation by S j has the same effect on its service
offerings in both network providers. Namely, after the service
innovation by S j , we have for some η j > 0 γij := γij + η j ,
i = 1, 2, and γ j := γ j + 2η j . On the other hand, service
innovation by S j may also affect its marginal cost sj , namely
from sj to sj + σ j . The effect of service innovation on the
marginal cost can be either positive (i.e., σ j > 0), or negative
(i.e., σ j ≤ 0), or neutral. All three options are accounted for
in the model, which captures the effect of service innovation
by S j using two parameters (η j , σ j ), where η j > 0.
Let Πj,bef ore denote the overall profit of service provider S j
before service innovation, and Πj,af ter its profit after service
innovation. In order for S j to have an incentive to innovate,
its profit after service innovation should be larger than before
service innovation. In other words, we must have
I j (η j , σ j ) := Πj,af ter − Πj,bef ore > 0.

(10)

It can be shown that I(η j , σ j ) is an increasing function in
η j and a decreasing function in σ j . Hence if σ j < 0, i.e.,
service innovation by S j decreases its marginal cost, then for
any η j > 0, I(η j , σ j ) > 0. Therefore when service innovation
leads to a decrease in its marginal cost, it always pays for
S j to innovate. On the other hand, when σ j > 0, service
innovation by S j would lead to an increase in its marginal
cost. In this case, we can show that provided that s1 + s2 +
n1 + n2 << 1 − βp, there exists a constant cj > 0 such that
j
if σ j < cj γ jη+ηj (1 − βp), then I(η j , σ j ) > 0. Hence in this
case, it is only when the increase in its marginal cost is upper
bounded by an appropriate gain in its market share that service
innovation by S j would then pay off. Otherwise, there is no
incentive for S j to innovate.
B. Incentives for Network Upgrade
Likewise, we model the effect of network upgrade by
network provider Ni using two parameters, (ηi , μi ), where
ηi > 0 reflects an increase in Ni ’s market share as a result
of its upgrade, i.e, γi1 := γi1 + ηi , γi2 := γi2 + ηi and thus
γi := γi + 2ηi ; whereas μi reflects the resulting change in
its marginal cost, ni := ni + μi , which can again be either
positive, negative or neutral. The incentive function Ii for Ni
is given by
Ii (ηi , μi ) := Πi,af ter − Πi,bef ore ,

(11)

where Πi,bef ore and Πi,af ter denote the profit of Ni before
and after network upgrade, respectively. Ni has incentive to
upgrade its network if and only if Ii (ηi , μi ) > 0. Again we
can show that when network upgrade leads to a decrease in its
marginal cost, i.e., μi < 0, it always pays for Ni to upgrade
its network. On the other hand, when μi > 0, it is only
when the increase in its marginal cost is upper bounded by an
appropriate gain in its market share that network upgrade by
Ni would pay off. Otherwise, Ni has no incentive to upgrade.
V. C ONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have developed a simple economic model
to study the interactions and competition among service
providers, network providers and users. The novelty of the
model lies in combining Cournot and Bertrand competition to
capture the co-dependent, interacting and competitive relationships among service providers and network providers. Using
this model, we explored how these relationships can affect
incentives for innovation on the part of network providers and
service providers. Our work represents a modest first attempt
in characterizing and modeling the intricate and complex
interactions that exist between various actors in a “serviceoriented” Internet. We plan to further expand this model
to include more realistic inter-connection structures among
network providers and service providers, and thereby more
faithfully capture the complex interactive and competitive
relationships among them. We would also like to incorporate
competition among network providers for users, and study
the dynamics of evolving relationships among these actors.
Conducting empirical studies of these relations based on real
data is also a research area of great interest to us.
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